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THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

Sarah H. Cleveland*
The topic of this panel is civil participation in the global trading
system, with a particular focus on Doe v. Unocal Corp.1 and use of
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to enforce fundamental human rights
norms against multinational corporations. These comments will
therefore attempt to locate Doe v. Unocal and other ATS litigation in
the broader efforts of civil society to establish and maintain
normative principles for corporate responsibility in the global trading
regime. This comment first explains the role of ATS litigation in the
broader civil society context and the contribution of ATS cases to the
development and enforcement of international human rights law. It
then briefly responds to two recent criticisms of ATS litigation: that
ATS litigation is spiraling out of control and that suits under the
ATS improperly infringe on U.S. foreign relations. I argue that ATS
litigation has played an important role in the recent overall global
development of enforceable human rights norms, that traditional
procedural and prudential mechanisms are working effectively to
identify appropriate ATS claims, and that extraordinary measures
such as the current administration's attempts to obtain dismissal of
corporate ATS suits are contrary to longstanding U.S. human rights
policy and simply damage the United States' standing as an
international leader in the promotion and protection of human
rights.
I.

THE ATS AND

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

The Unocal case and other suits under the ATS represent the
flipside of the relationship between civil society and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) considered in the first half of this symposium.
Unlike the situation at the WTO, where civil society is knocking for
admission at the door of an established international institution with
*

Marrs McLean Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law; A.B. 1987,

Brown University; M.St. 1989, Oxford University; J.D. 1992, Yale Law School. I am
grateful to Hollin Dickerson for her invaluable assistance with this project.
1. Doe v. Unocal Corp., No. 00-56603, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en
banc granted, opinion vacated by Doe v. Unocal Corp., No. 00-56628, 2003 WL 359787
(9th Cir. 2003) (settlement entered March 2005).
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enforcement capacity over a body of international law, in the ATS
context, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other members
of civil society are searching for a venue in which they can enforce
established international norms. I am reminded a bit of the
Pirandello play, Six Characters in Search of an Author.2 Here, we
have six figurative human rights plaintiffs in search of a forum. They
are looking for some place in the world where they can enforce their
claim, because no international tribunal or institution currently
exists that is capable of enforcing international human rights norms
in most contexts, even universally recognized norms like genocide
and torture. The ATS establishes the U.S. court system as one of the
few fora in the world that is available to provide judicial enforcement
of core international human rights norms, in the limited
circumstances discussed below.
The Unocal case arose from a contact between a law student and
the General Secretary of the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma, U
Maung, who was living as a refugee in Thailand following his
involvement in the 1988 pro-democracy uprising in Burma. U Maung
had read a story in Reader's Digest about an American couple who
had successfully sued for damages after their dog was accidentally
over-anesthetized by a veterinarian. U Maung read the story and
thought that if it was possible under U.S. law to sue your
veterinarian for the accidental death of your dog, shouldn't you be
able to sue for damages when a U.S. corporation used forced labor to
build a billion dollar pipeline in a country like Burma? He asked this
question to a U.S. law student. Apparently it was an extremely
diligent law student who went back and researched possible causes of
action, and the Doe v. Unocal litigation was born.3
Recent corporate ATS cases such as Unocal have been the
product of three converging forces in civil society and the global
trading regime. The first force is the development of the
international human rights regime. The post-World War II era, and
particularly the past several decades, has seen the proliferation and
universal acceptance of fundamental international human rights
norms. This process has occurred through the development of
international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights; specialized treaty regimes such as the Torture and
Genocide Conventions and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,

2.

LUIGI PIRANDELLO, Six Characters in Search of an Author, in PIRANDELLO'S

MAJOR PLAYS 65, 65-120 (1991).
3. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing
Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 183, 187 (2002).
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and regional human rights instruments. This promulgation of human
rights instruments has been complemented by the establishment of
international and regional bodies charged with overseeing
compliance with fundamental human rights norms. The resulting
multifaceted network of law and institutions has helped create the
body of norms being enforced through the ATS.
The second force impacting corporate ATS litigation is the
globalization of the international economy. Corporations now are
scouring the far corners of the earth in search of profits and entering
transnational business arrangements as they never have before.4 The
increasingly global reach of multinational corporations leads them to
places like Burma, where they may, on occasion, enter into joint
ventures with governments that are gross human rights violators, or
otherwise aid and abet egregious human rights abuse.
The third critical force in this process is the development of the
internet and global telecommunications. Increasingly worldwide
access to rapid and inexpensive communication systems allows global
civil society to know what is happening in places like Burma, to
coordinate international responses in distant locations, and to report
developments instantaneously around the world.
Suits brought under the ATS to enforce fundamental human
rights norms are part of a very broad, decentralized but concerted
transnational effort by international civil society to try to articulate,
disseminate and integrate fundamental human rights into domestic
practices.5 Doe v. Unocal, for example, simply represents one very
important thread in an elaborate fabric that civil society has crafted
targeting human rights violations in Burma. Since the Burmese
military junta violently suppressed the 1988 democratic uprising and
refused to recognize the democratically elected government in 1990,
4.

Sarah H. Cleveland, Why InternationalLabor Standards?, in INTERNATIONAL

LABOR STANDARDS:

GLOBALIZATION,

TRADE AND

PUBLIC POLICY

141

(Robert J.

Flanagan & William J. Gould, IV, eds., 2003) (discussing capital mobility).
5. As McDougal and Reisman have observed, international law is created through
a "staggering[ly]" diverse process of communication within the global community:
The peoples of the world communicate to each other expectations about
policy, authority, and control, not merely through state or intergovernmental
organs, but through reciprocal claims and mutual tolerances in all their
interactions. The participants in the relevant processes of communication...
include not merely the officials of states and intergovernmental
organizations but also the representatives of political parties, pressure
groups, private associations, and the individual human being qua individual
with all his or her identifications.
Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function: How
International Law Is Made, 6 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 (1980), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 84
(1981).

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

the international community has united in condemning human
rights conditions in that state. The U.N. General Assembly and the
U.N. Human Rights Commission have adopted annual resolutions
condemning Burma's human rights practices.6 The 1991 Nobel peace
prize was awarded to Aung San Suu Kyi, the democratically elected
leader of Burma who has been under house arrest for most of the
time since 1990.7 The United States and the European Union have
imposed sanctions on Burma and denied travel visas to members of
the Burmese junta.8 Efforts by states and regional and international
inter-governmental bodies have coalesced with those of a range of
"transnational norm entrepreneurs"--unions, religious groups,
journalists, activists, human and labor rights organizations,
consumer advocates, and other international and national NGO's-to
engage in complementary efforts to condemn, violations and bring
some kind of human rights change in that country. 10
The issue of labor standards has played a very important role in
the global criticism of Burma. The United States and the European
Union have withheld Generalized System of Preferences tariff
benefits as a result of Burma's use of forced labor.11 The
International Labor Organization (ILO) also has issued numerous
reports condemning the use of forced labor in that state. Most
notably, in 1997 the ILO appointed a commission of special inquiry to
conduct an extensive review of Burma's forced labor practices. The
6. See, e.g., Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 53/162, U.N.
GAOR, 53d Sess., 85th mtg., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/162 (1998), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda (last visited Feb. 20, 2005); see also Situation of
Human Rights in Myanmar, Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 1999/17, U.N. ESCOR,
53d Sess., 52d mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/17 (1999), available at http:/
www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
7. Aung San Suu Kyi, BRITTANICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at
www.brittanica.com/ebc/article?tocld=9356143 (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
8. See, e.g., Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, §§
3, 6, 117 Stat. 864 (2003) (ban on imports and visas); 1997 Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104- 208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 166 (1996)
(authorizing a range of U.S. investment and other sanctions against Burma);
Proclamation No. 6245, 3 C.F.R. 7, 7-9 (1992), reprinted in 105 Stat. 2484, 2484-86
(1991) (suspending Burma's preferential status under U.S. generalized system of
preferences); Proclamation No. 5955, 3 C.F.R. 29, 29-31 (1990), reprinted in 103 Stat.
3010, 3011-13 (1989) (same); Council Regulation No. 552/97 of 24 Mar. 1997
Temporarily Withdrawing Access to Generalized Tariff Preferences From the Union of
Myanmar, 1997 O.J. (L 085) 1, 8 (European Union).
9. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing InternationalLaw
Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 647-48 (1998) (discussing the role of transnational norm
entrepreneurs in transnational legal process).
10. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalizationand U.S. Economic Sanctions,
26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7-18 (2001) (examining the range of transnational efforts
condemning Burma's human rights practices).
11. See sources cited supra note 8.
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commission issued a major report12 that provided much of the factual
information for the Unocal suit.13 And the ILO recently took the
unprecedented step of acting under Article 33 of its Constitution to
call upon ILO members to review their relationships with Burma and
ensure that they were not contributing to the use of forced labor in
that country.14 So to some extent the Doe v. Unocal suit is serving as
an enforcement arm for the ILO prohibition against the use of forced
labor. This is a classic example of what Harold Koh has labeled
transnational public law litigation: a process by which a human
rights principle articulated in an international forum is then
elaborated through the sieve and ferment of civil society and is
finally transferred to a domestic forum, in this case U.S. federal
courts, where the norm is further refined and enforced.15
II.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
DEVELOPMENT

Litigation under the ATS has played an important role in the
articulation of international human rights norms and the
development of international principles of individual accountability.
The statute has generally been heralded by foreign governments,
international organizations, and U.N. agencies as a significant
mechanism for enforcing international human rights norms.16 The
ATS has contributed to the efforts of global civil society in developing
12. Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma), Report of the Commission of Inquiry
Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour
Organization to Examine the Observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour
available at
http://
Doc.
1930
(No.
29)
(1998),
Convention, ILO
(last visited
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm
Feb. 20, 2005).
13. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., No. 00-56603, 2002 WL 31063976, at *4 (9th Cir.
2002), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated by Doe v. Unocal Corp., No. CV-9606959, 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing ILO findings regarding use of forced
labor in Burma).
14. Resolution on the Widespread Use of Forced Labour in Myanmar, ILO, 87th
Sess. (June 1999), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/
ilc87/com-myan.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2004). In November 2000, the ILO
Governing Body reaffirmed its 1999 resolution and called upon ILO members to
ensure that their relations with the Burmese government "do not perpetuate or extend
the system of forced or compulsory labour in that country." Press Release, ILO, ILO
Governing Body Opens the Way for Unprecedented Action Against Forced Labour in
Myanmar (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/
inflpr/2000/44.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2004).
15. See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2349, 2395, 2397 (1991) (describing norm articulation and transfer through
transnational legal process).
16. See Brief of Amici Curiae International Jurists in Support of Affirmance, at 1320, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339) [hereinafter Brief of
International Jurists] (collecting sources).
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the human rights regime in at least five ways.
First, ATS judgments have helped define and clarify the
substantive content of fundamental norms of international human
rights law, such as torture. Other tribunals, such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
have invoked substantive norms recognized in ATS litigation as
violations of fundamental international human rights law.17
Second, ATS suits have helped identify which fundamental
international rights norms require state action and which do not. In
Kadic v. Karad-i6,is for example, the Second Circuit held that acts of
genocide and war crimes do not require state action.19 The ICTY has
relied upon the Kadic reasoning to conclude that crimes against
humanity likewise do not require state action for the imposition of
international criminal liability under international law.20
Third, the ATS has played an important role in developing the
concept of universal civil jurisdiction under international law. The
principle of universal jurisdiction allows a state to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction-e.g., to regulate conduct that occurs in
another country-without a territorial, national, or protective nexus
to that state. 21 Although international law recognizes universal
criminal jurisdiction over international crimes such as genocide,
torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity,22 whether
international law authorizes states to exercise universal civil
jurisdiction is less firmly established.23 In their joint concurrence in
the Congo v. Belgium case, the British, Dutch, and U.S. judges of the
International Court of Justice cited ATS litigation as part of the
process of developing universal jurisdiction over major human rights

17. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 38 I.L.M. 317, 347 (1999) (citing FilArtiga v. PefiaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), as recognizing a "universal revulsion against
torture"); see also Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its FiftyThird Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 284 n.683, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001) (citing the ATS approach to show that national tribunals have recognized the
peremptory
character
of
certain
fundamental
rights),
available at
www.un.org/law.ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
18. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
19. Id. at 236.
20. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 36 I.L.M. 913, 945 (1997) (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232).
21.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 402, 404 (1987) (discussing bases for prescriptive jurisdiction).
22. COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSES 5-8 (2000) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT].

23. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 404 cmt. b ("[I]nternational law does not
preclude the application of non-criminal law on this [universal] basis, for example, by
providing a remedy in tort or restitution for victims of piracy.").
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violations.24 One of the leading contemporary international law
treatises also cites the Fildrtiga case in support of the proposition
that serious violations of human rights, such as torture, are subject
to universal jurisdiction,25 and the Report on Universal Jurisdiction
of the International Law Association notes that the United States
has exercised universal civil jurisdiction "with some success."26
Finally, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the European Commission cited
ATS practices as generally consistent with the development of
international civil universal jurisdiction.27
Fourth, the ATS has inspired the development abroad of
mechanisms for human rights enforcement. In the Pinochet litigation,
the British Law Lords invoked litigation under the ATS in support of
the proposition that violations of the international prohibition
against torture are justiciable in national courts. 28 The British Court
of Appeal recently went further and recognized the right to sue in
Britain for acts of torture committed abroad, relying at length on
U.S. jurisprudence under the ATS.29 Many European states allow
private citizens to bring an "action civile," in which civil claims may
be appended to criminal prosecutions for fundamental violations.30
Under this mechanism, the French oil company Total, which was
Unocal's partner in the Yadana pipeline project and was originally
sued in the Unocal case,31 is currently under criminal investigation
24. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 1,
47-48 (Feb. 14, 2002) (Joint Separate Opinion
of Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, JJ.).
25. 1 ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 46970 n.23 (9th ed. 1996).
26. FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-3 n.6.
27. Brief of Amici Curiae European Commission in Support of Neither Party, at
14-25, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339) [hereinafter EC
Brief] (discussing development of universal civil jurisdiction and proposing that ATS
litigation exercising such jurisdiction should be allowed where a traditional forum is
unavailable).
28. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 198 (1999) (judgments of Lord BrowneWilkinson and Lord Hope of Craighead).
29. Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2004] EWCA Civil 1394, 1,
61-68 (Oct. 28, 2004)
(discussing ATS cases).
30. See Brief of International Jurists, supra note 16, at 23-25; Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at
2783 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing EC Brief,
supra note 29, at 21 n.48)); see also Compilation of International Norms and
Standards Relating to Disability, Division for Social Policy and Development of the
United
Nations
Secretariat,
§
1.2
(Draft,
July 2002),
available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/discoml01.htm (noting that the Fildrtiga case
demonstrates the domestic enforceability of customary international law) (last visited
Feb. 20, 2005).
31. The claims against Total were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. See
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 248 F.3d 915 (9th

978

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

in France for complicity in the forced labor practices implicated by
the pipeline. A Swiss court recently allowed Gypsies to pursue a civil
tort action against IBM for Holocaust violations.32 The ATS also has
been recognized as a model for establishing national remedies for
human rights abuses by U.N. special rapporteurs, 33 and India's
National Commission on Human Rights has invoked the ATS as an
example for the development of domestic legal remedies for human
rights violations in that state. 34 Belgium recently adopted a criminal
statute allowing private citizens to initiate criminal proceedings for
gross human rights abuses based on principles of universal
jurisdiction, though the jurisdictional scope of the statute was
ultimately severely limited, ironically in response to U.S. pressure. 35
As the most significant corporate ATS suit to date, Doe v. Unocal
itself contributed importantly to many of these developments in
human rights accountability. Doe v. Unocal helped establish that
forced labor, as a derivative form of slavery, constitutes a specific,
universal, and obligatory norm of customary international law that is
actionable under the ATS.36 The Ninth Circuit panel opinion
established that state action is not required for claims based on
forced labor,37 and helped establish that state action is not required
for other human rights violations such as torture if they occur in the
course of other violations, such as forced labor, that have no state

Cir. 2001).
32. Tallahassee Democrat, Swiss Court Allows Gypsies to Sue IBM over Alleged
Holocaust Link, June 22, 2004, availableat http://www.tallahassee.com/mld/
tallahassee/business/technology/8983143.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
33. See The Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of
InternationalHuman Rights and HumanitarianLaw: Note by the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Human Rights Comm'n, 59th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 11, at
114, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/63 (2002) (offering the ATS as an
example for states to "provide remedies for violations occurring outside their
territory"); see also Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery,
and Slavery-Like PracticesDuringArmed Conflict: Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay
J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Human Rights Comm'n, 50th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 6, at app.,
52, U.N. Doc. EICN.41Sub.2/1998/13 (1998)
(applauding the ATS for providing a forum for redress when foreign fora are
inadequate).
34. See Sadar Patel Bhawan, Nat'l Human Rights Comm'n, Case No. 1/97/NHRC,
at 23 (Aug. 4, 1997), availableat http://www.punjabjustice.orgflegalbattles/
nhrcdocs/aug97.htm (lastvisited Feb. 20, 2005).
35. Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 888-89 (2003) (discussing Belgian statute). The statute was amended to limit
it to claims where either the victim or the defendant is a citizen or resident of Belgium.
Id. at 891.
36. Doe v. Unocal Corp., No. 00-56603, 2002 WL 31063976, at *10 (9th Cir. 2002).
37. Id. at*10.
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action requirement.38
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Ninth Circuit panel
decision in Unocal was a major step forward in the effort to define
and clarify the appropriate standard for corporate complicity in
fundamental human rights violations. The Nuremberg cases of Flick,
Krauch, and Krupp addressed this issue,39 among others, so the
question was not unprecedented. But few, if any, modern courts had
addressed the legal question of corporate complicity in gross
international human rights violations.4o The Ninth circuit decision in
Doe v. Unocal looked back to the cases at Nuremberg, as well as to
more modern decisions by the international criminal tribunals and
the statute of the International Criminal Court, to help determine
the international law standard for when a private actor (in this case
a corporation), could be held liable for the acts of another party.41 The
standard that the majority adopted was that the entity must engage
in "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime."42 In other words,
mere investment by a corporation in a country where the government
engages in human rights abuses does not give rise to liability. The
corporation must engage in "practical assistance or encouragement"
that has a substantial, direct effect on commission of the violation.
Interestingly, the European Commission's amicus brief in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain agreed with the use of this international standard
in the ATS context.43
Ultimately, of course, the goal of civil society in pursuing
corporate human rights litigation is to try to encourage corporations
to review their human rights practices and to engage in more
responsible investment conduct. ATS supporters seek to encourage
corporations to invest internationally in ways that do not aid and
abet the grossest forms of human rights abuse. The evidence in the
Unocal case, for example, tended to establish that Unocal knew of
38. Id. at*15.
39. United States v. Krauch, 8 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1081, 1140 (1952) (the I.G.
Farben case); United States v. Krupp, 9 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremburg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1436 (1952);
United States v. Flick, 6 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremburg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1442 (1950).
40. Paul Hoffman & Daniel Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law
and Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 47, 70-71 (2003) (discussing aiding and abetting principles under international
law).
41. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *12.
42. Id. at*10.
43. EC Brief supra note 29, at 11-12 (citing with approval the Doe v. Unocal aiding
and abetting standard).
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the government's human rights abuses, knew or should have known
forced labor would occur as a result of the pipeline project, and
benefited from the practice.44 Indeed, before investing in Burma,
Unocal hired a consultant who warned that forced labor would
necessarily be implicated in the project, and that Unocal likely could
not avoid the use of forced labor if the company engaged in this
particular project.45 Suits like Unocal may encourage future
companies to heed such advice, and thus form a small but important
element in the move toward greater global corporate responsibility.
In addition to contributing to the development of human rights
norms, ATS corporate litigation promotes broader civil society
developments regarding corporate responsibility. In August 2003, the
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights adopted new U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, which
set forth standards for responsible corporate behavior under
international law norms relating to human rights, the environment,
consumer protection and other areas. 46 The Norms and their
accompanying commentary themselves were produced through the
concerted efforts of international civil society organizations, with the
hope that corporations will look to the Norms for a checklist on how
to conduct themselves consistently with fundamental international
law requirements. Corporate suits like Unocal may help encourage
corporations to look to, and utilize, those Norms in reviewing their
with
compliance
conversely,
And
behavior.
investment
internationally recognized standards such as the U.N. Norms could
help provide guidance to corporations on how to conform their
economic activities to the minimum requirements of international
law and avoid possible liability under the ATS. Together, corporate
ATS suits and the U.N. Norms thus may create a mutually
reinforcing dialogue for promoting both global corporate
responsibility and the international rule of law.

44. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at **4-6, 10, 15.
45. Id. at *4 ("Before Unocal acquired an interest in the Project, it hired a
consulting company, Control Risk Group, to assess the risks involved in the
investment. In May 1992, Control Risk Group informed Unocal that '[t]hroughout
Burma the government habitually makes use of forced labour to construct roads.'
Control Risk Group concluded that '[i]n such circumstances UNOCAL and its partners
will have little freedom of manoeuvre."').
46. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Human Rights
Comm'n, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 4, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2
http://www.unhchr.ch/HuridocdafHuridoca.nsf/0/
at
available
(2003),
64155e7e8141b38cc1256d63002c55e8?Opendocument (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
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ENFORCEMENT

Contrary to the claims of many corporate representatives that
there are "no limits on this thing,"47 the ATS is a very limited and
difficult mechanism that is available to enforce only the narrowest,
most universally recognized forms of human rights violations. As
noted above, and as the Supreme Court recognized in Sosa, in order
to be actionable under the ATS, a human rights norm must be
"specific, universal and obligatory."48 Lower courts accordingly have
recognized that litigants have standing to raise claims only of such
core human rights violations as genocide and war crimes,49 crimes
against humanity,50 torture, 51 summary execution,52 disappearance,53
and in the Unocal case, forced labor.
Courts have routinely
dismissed cases that fail to satisfy this rigorous standard for
determining claims actionable under the modern law of nations.54
Furthermore, litigants must clear formidable procedural and
prudential hurdles in order to bring a successful corporate ATS suit.
The plaintiff must obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant
within the United States,55 must satisfy any applicable statute of
limitations, and must prevail over requests for dismissal based on
the act of state doctrine, the political question doctrine, principles of
international comity, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Litigants suing a corporate defendant often must pierce the corporate
veil to recover from the corporate parent. If state action is required
for the human rights norm being enforced, litigants suing a private
corporation may have to demonstrate the defendant's complicity in
acts taken under color of law by a third party.56 Foreign states or
47. Statement of Daniel O'Flaherty, Vice President of the National Foreign Trade
Council, Rutgers School of Law Symposium, Mar. 5, 2004; see generally GARY
HUFBAUER, AWAKENING

MONSTER:

THE

ALIEN

TORT STATUTE

OF

1789

(2003)

(emphasizing the potential for abuse of ATS litigation).
48. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 (2004) (quoting Hilao v. In re
Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
49. Kadic v. Karadi, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995).
50. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
51. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Hilao v. In re Estate of
Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
52. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (summary execution and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment).
53. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
54. E.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2003)
(affirming dismissal of action alleging violations of the rights to life and health from
intrastate pollution).
55. E.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (dismissing
claims against Total for lack of personal jurisdiction).
56. For further discussion of the substantive and procedural barriers to ATS
litigation, see Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate
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leaders that are sued under the ATS are entitled to sovereign or
head-of-state immunity.57 And of course, any litigant must
successfully prove, not merely plead, satisfaction of the difficult
substantive legal standards comprehended by the ATS. Finally, these
cases are extremely expensive to bring due to the international
discovery and travel that they often involve.58 Indeed, no ATS case to
date has resulted in a finding of liability against a corporate
defendant, and only the Unocal case has resulted in a settlement for
payment to the plaintiffs.
One should also note that corporations that wish the ATS would
go away are simply ignoring the availability of other legal
mechanisms to reach this type of conduct. While the Doe v. Unocal
suit was pending in California federal court, analogous claims
against Unocal proceeded to trial in California state courts, not
under the ATS but under California state law claims. The Torture
Victim Protection Act59 also potentially allows for liability by
corporations for acts of torture and summary execution. For all of
these reasons, governmental and corporate hysteria over the
limitless bounds of the ATS appears greatly exaggerated.
IV.

INTERFERENCE WITH

U.S.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The second primary criticism raised recently regarding ATS
suits is the claim by the Bush administration that ATS litigation
improperly interferes with U.S. foreign relations. This is a new
development. In Fildrtiga, the Carter administration submitted an
amicus brief indicating that the litigation was consistent with the
human
rights
to
promote
responsibility
States'
United
internationally.60 The State and Justice Departments jointly
Responsibility Litigation,J. Int'l Econ. L. 263, 269 (2004); Sarah H. Cleveland, Global
Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1565-66,1575-78
(1998) (book review); see also Koh, supra note 15, at 2382-94 (discussing the
availability of ordinary procedural mechanisms to filter out inappropriate suits).
57. British courts have observed that the U.S. courts have limited the application
of the ATS in appropriate cases by doctrines such as foreign sovereign immunity. See
Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. at 243-44 (judgment of Lord Hope of Craighead) (citing
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992)); A1-Adsani v.
Gov't of Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536, 547-48 (Eng. C.A. 1996) (same).
58. See Collingsworth, supra note 3, at 202 (noting that "the costs and time
involved in bringing an ATCA case require that it be viewed as an extraordinary
remedy").
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004) (note).
60. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae United States, FilArtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 602-03 (1980)
(citations omitted) ("[I]n nations such as the United States where international law is
part of the law of the land, an individual's fundamental human rights are in certain
cases directly enforceable in domestic courts.").
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observed that "[s]uch suits unquestionably implicate foreign policy
considerations. But not every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Like many other
areas affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental
human rights is not committed exclusively to the political branches of
government."61 The Reagan administration represented in the
Marcos litigation that the suits against former head of state
Ferdinand Marcos "would not embarrass the relations between the
United States and the Government of the Philippines."62 In Kadic,
the Solicitor General and the Legal Advisor of the State Department
likewise submitted a joint brief in support of the litigation.63 The
government indicated that the possibility that the defendant might
one day be recognized as a head of state by the executive branch did
not bar the suit's justiciability.64 In 1997, the California district court
asked the Clinton administration about the foreign affairs
implications of the Unocal case, and the administration indicated
that "adjudication of the claims based on allegations of torture and
slavery would not prejudice or impede the conduct of U.S. foreign
relations with the current government of Burma."65 Indeed, prior to
this administration, executive branches consistently have either
actively supported litigation or remained neutral in such cases. It
appears that no prior administration formally opposed ATS litigation
on foreign relations grounds.
But the current administration on several occasions has
submitted State Department statements of interest and amicus
briefs objecting to ATS litigation against corporations and urging
dismissal on the grounds that the suit negatively infringes on U.S.
foreign relations.66 The government's strategy proved successful in
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, a case involving environmental claims in Papua
New Guinea, which was dismissed based in part on the United
States' representation that the litigation was disrupting a dubious
indigenous peace negotiation.67 In Doe v. Unocal, the administration
submitted multiple amicus briefs urging dismissal on, inter alia

61. Id. at 603.
62. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, at 32, Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439
(9th Cir. 1989) (Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039).
63. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, at 2, Kadic v. Karadfi6, 70 F.3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069).
64. Id. at 1.
65. Nat'l Coalition Gov't of Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
66. See generally Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration'sEfforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169
(2004).
67. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1178-79 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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foreign relations grounds.68 In Doe v. Exxon Mobil, alleging human
rights violations by Exxon Mobil in Indonesia, the administration
submitted a statement of interest stating that the lawsuit could
alienate the Indonesian government and detrimentally affect
Indonesia's willingness to cooperate with the United States in the
war on terror.69 Most recently, the administration urged that a suit
alleging human rights violations by Occidental Petroleum in
Colombia "will have an adverse impact on the foreign policy interests
of the United States."70
The administration's position appears both politically motivated
and contrary to firmly entrenched U.S. human rights policy goals.
Promotion of international human rights has long been a core part of
U.S. foreign policy and is currently advanced, among other things,
through the annual State Department Country Reports on human
rights practices as well as through numerous U.S foreign economic
assistance, military assistance, and trade laws that condition
benefits on foreign states' human rights compliance.71 The United
States also has imposed a variety of non-economic sanctions on
human rights violators.
Both the Unocal and Exxon Mobil suits are fully consistent with
longstanding U.S. foreign policies regarding human rights violations
in those countries. With respect to Burma, for example, the United
States has repeatedly condemned the Burmese government for
human rights violations, has withheld diplomatic relations, and has
imposed a range of sanctions on the country. Federal law denies
trade preferences to Burma, bars U.S. investment in Burma, and
prohibits the importation of Burmese goods into the United States.
68. E.g., Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States, at 14, Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628) (arguing that
recognition of corporate aiding and abetting liability in ATS cases "would, in essence,
be depriving the Executive of an important tactic of diplomacy and available tools for
the political branches in attempting to induce improvements in foreign human rights
practices") (on file with author).
69. Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to the
Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Colombia
(July 29, 2002), available at http://www.laborrights.org [hereinafter Taft Letter] (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005). One can wonder how much the administration's position had to
do with the fact that Exxon was the second largest contributor to the Bush
presidential campaign in 2000, after the Enron Corporation. Peter Waldman &
Timothy Mapes, White House Sets New Hurdles For Suits Over Rights Abuses, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, available at http://www.laborrights.org/press/wsj080702.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005).
70. Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, at 1
(discussing Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., CV 03-2860-WJR (Dec. 23, 2004))
(on file with the author).
71. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 31-48 (cataloguing U.S. economic sanctions tied to
human rights compliance).
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The United States denies immigration visas to members of the
Burmese government. 72 Likewise, the U.S. State Department
repeatedly has criticized the Indonesian government for the same
human rights violations alleged in the Exxon Mobil case. 73 Congress
has condemned Indonesia for human rights abuses74 and suspended
military assistance to Indonesia for much of the 1990's on this
grounds.75 U.S. courts also have found high-ranking members of the
Indonesian military responsible for human rights violations in that
76
country.
The U.S. policy of promoting international human rights has
extended to ensuring human rights compliance by U.S. corporations.
In 2001, for example, the United States and the United Kingdom
entered an agreement establishing joint principals governing the
human rights practices of companies in the extractive industries,
such as oil and mining77-the same companies that are most
commonly subject to ATS suits.
Nor has ATS litigation provoked significant objection from
foreign governments. In their concurrence in Congo v. Belgium, the
British, Dutch, and U.S. judges observed that litigation under the
ATS "has not attracted the approbation of states generally."78 The

72. See sources collected supra note 8.
73. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Indonesia Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices- 2001 (2002), available at http:lwww.state.govlg/drl/rlslhrrpt/200leapl
8314.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) ("[Tlhe military continues to play a substantial
internal security role in areas of conflict, such as Aceh .... Members of both the TNI
and the police committed numerous serious human rights abuses."); U.S. Dep't of
State, Indonesia Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2000 (2001); U.S. Dep't
of State, Indonesia Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 1999 (2000); U.S.
Dep't of State, Indonesia Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 1997 (1998).
Indeed, the State Department's Statement of Interest in the Exxon Mobil case
"reaffirm[s] [the State Department's] condemnation of human rights abuses by
elements of the Indonesian armed forces in locations such as Aceh." Taft Letter, supra
note 71, at 2.
74. See, e.g., S. Res. 91, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S6531, at 4 (2001) (urging
Indonesia to end "the climate of impunity" that shields human rights violators in the
Indonesian military from justice).
75. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 38.
76. E.g., Doe v. Major Gen. Johnny Lumintang, No. 00-674, (D.D.C. 2001); Todd v.
General Panjaitan, No. 92-12255WD, (D. Mass., Oct. 25, 1994).
77. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights (Dec. 20, 2000), at 1, available at
(last
http://www.state.gov/www/globallhuman-rights/001220_- fsdrl-principles.html
visited Feb. 20, 2005) (providing guidelines for companies in the extractive industries
for "maintaining the safety and security of their operations within an operating
framework that ensures respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms").
78. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 1, at 48 (Feb. 14, 2002) (Joint Separate Opinion of
Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, JJ.).
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Sosa litigation likewise did not attract a great deal of commentary
from foreign governments. If frivolous ATS litigation were in fact
proliferating against foreign nationals and industries and creating
friction with foreign states, one might have expected a vociferous
appearance from foreign governments in that case. However, Mexico,
whose national was being sued, did not appear as an amicus. In fact,
only one foreign government amicus brief was submitted in support
of the defendant in Sosa, and that was the amicus brief of Great
Britain, Switzerland and Australia79---three countries whose
companies have been sued in the South African apartheid
litigation.S0 This international response is in stark contrast to that in
the 1994 Barclays Bank caseS1 regarding the constitutionality of
California's worldwide combined reporting taxation law, which many
countries viewed as double taxation in violation of international law.
Numerous foreign countries and corporate interests filed amicus
briefs vociferously protesting that practice in the U.S. Supreme
Court.82 The U.S. government, however, took the position that
California's law had no negative impact on U.S. foreign relations,83
and the Supreme Court upheld the California law.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court recognized the "possibil[ity]" of
"case-specific deference to the political branches,"84 noting that in
circumstances such as the South African Apartheid cases,8 5 "there is
a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to

79. Brief of Amici Curiae Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the
Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
in Support of the Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03339), available at http://www.nosafehaven.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) [hereinafter
Brief of the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia].
80. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 2004 WL 2722204 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting
defendants' motion to dismiss). Indeed, in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, the British Court of
Appeal observed with approval that "sensitive issues involving judgments about the
treatment or protection that would be received in other countries not infrequently
arise in a human rights context, and have been no bar to the exercise of jurisdiction
over foreign states in respect of systematic torture in the United States." Jones v.
Saudi Arabia, [2004] EWCA Civil 1394, 92 (Oct. 28, 2004).
81. Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
82. Proceedings and Orders, Barclays Bank, PLC v, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. (No.
92-1384-CSX) (on file with author).
83. Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States, at 10, Barclays Bank, PLC v.
Franchise Tax Board of California 512 U.S. 298 (No. 92-1384) ("Further review by this
Court is not needed to achieve, and could potentially destabilize, the accommodation of
state, national and international interests that has been reached on this issue.").
84. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2766, n.21 (2004).
85. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(finding that multinational corporations merely doing business in apartheid South
Africa was not a violation of international law to support jurisdiction under ATS).
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the Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy."86
The democratically elected government of South Africa has strongly
objected to that litigation, indicating that the suits may undermine
the South African Truth and Reconciliation process and are contrary
to the investment desires and policies of the South African
government.S7 Even for ATS cases that provoke significant foreign
relations tensions, however, a wide range of effective procedural and
prudential mechanisms exist for addressing these concerns, as noted
above. Suits under the ATS must be narrowly targeted to address
very fundamental, gross human rights violations. Indeed, by limiting
the claims that may be litigated under the ATS to international
norms enjoying universal recognition, the Sosa Court attempted to
avoid most foreign relations concerns about ATS cases.88
It may be that certain rare cases should be dismissed in
deference to the successor home sovereign's request that the claims
be adjudicated domestically where truly effective mechanisms for
doing so exist. Both forum non conveniens and domestic exhaustion
principles require courts to consider whether the litigation should
more properly proceed in the home forum. Both the European
Commission and the Supreme Court suggested in Sosa, for example,
that suits involving foreign defendants perhaps should not be
brought under the ATS until available and appropriate domestic
remedies had been exhausted in the state where the claim arose.8 9
The Second Circuit dismissed the Aguinda v. Texaco case on forum
non conveniens grounds, based on the Ecuadorian government's
request that the litigation be pursued in Ecuador,90 and the litigation
has proceeded there. In a small number of cases, such action may be
appropriate. Even in such cases, however, the proper grounds for
dismissal might be a narrow requirement of exhaustion of
appropriate and available domestic remedies, rather than more
nebulous foreign relations grounds. Indeed, a generalized doctrine of
deference to the political branches would thwart principles of judicial

86. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766, n.21.
87. Brief of the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, supra note 81, at
app. B, 5a (Declaration by Penuell Mpapa Maduna, Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development of the Republic of South Africa).
88. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763 (recognizing that because recognition of "new norms of
international law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy considerations, they
should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution") (emphasis added).
89. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21 (noting the possibility of a domestic exhaustion
requirement for ATS cases); EC Brief, supra note 29, at 22 (arguing that ATS suits
based on universal jurisdiction should "be limited to conduct that would otherwise fall
beyond effective sanction').
90. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal
of environmental injury suit by citizens of Peru and Ecuador on grounds of forum non
conveniens).
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independence and collapse the separation of powers. 91
Moreover, to conclude from the fringe cases that core cases such
as Unocal should not be brought grossly undermines the legitimacy
of the United States' international human rights posture. The United
States repeatedly has pointed to the ATS in its representations to
U.N. bodies as an example of how the United States is working to
comply with its international obligations.92 Suits under the ATS, and
particularly the United States' willingness to tolerate ATS suits
against U.S. corporations, enhance the international credibility of the
United States' commitment to human rights at a time when that
commitment is being widely questioned. By contrast, the
administration's
interventions in ATS cases against U.S.
multinational corporations simply reinforce the view that the United
States is a hypocritical actor that seeks to impose human rights
standards on the outside world while being unwilling to accept them
itself.
CONCLUSION
Despite the narrow scope of the ATS, litigation under it has
contributed in incremental but important ways to the ongoing
development of a global human rights regime. The statute has
offered human rights litigants and civil society both a limited forum
in which to seek redress for atrocities and a model for the exploration
of human rights enforcement mechanisms by other states.
Adjudication of human rights violations in foreign states necessarily
has the potential to agitate foreign governments. But carving out a
space for corporate human rights litigation under the ATS also plays
an important role in preserving the United States' capacity for global
leadership in the defense of human rights.

91. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004) (opinion of O'Connor, J.,)
(noting that rather than respecting separation of powers, judicial deference to the
executive "serves only to condense power into a single branch of government")
92. See Brief of International Jurists, supra note 16, at 9-10 (noting that "[t]he
Executive Branch has repeatedly relied on Fildrtigaand the ATCA in representations
to the United Nations," and gathering sources).

